Main Technical Program

Tuesday, July 9, 2024
8:00 - 8:30	Breakfast and Registration
8:30 - 10:00	Accepted Papers
	Track A: Transportation	Track B: Information Design	Track C: Equilibrium Computation	Track D: Mechanism Design	Track E: Social Choice	Track F: Learning in Systems with Dynamics
	Forum (Room 1400)	Room 2200	Room 2420	Room 2400	Room 2410	Room 4200
	Chair: Zhen Lian	Chair: Bo Waggoner	Chair: David Pennock	Chair: Brendan Lucier	Chair: James Wright	Chair: Yash Kanoria
	Pricing Shared Rides Chiwei Yan, Julia Yan, Yifan Shen	Algorithmic Cheap Talk Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi	Constant Inapproximability for Fisher Markets Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Alexandros Hollender, Themistoklis Melissourgos	Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions Yang Cai, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu	Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong	Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Long-term Reference Effects Shipra Agrawal, Wei Tang
	On the Supply of Autonomous Vehicles in Platforms Daniel Freund, Ilan Lobel, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao	Complexity, Communication and Misrepresentation Junya Zhou, Collin Raymond	Competitive Equilibrium for Chores: from Dual Eisenberg-Gale to a Fast, Greedy, LP-based Algorithm Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta, Tianlong Nan	As-if Dominant Strategy Mechanisms Lea Nagel, Roberto Saitto	Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences Théo Delemazure, Dominik Peters	Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen McAleer, Andreas Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
	Market Fragmentation and Inefficiencies in Maritime Shipping Kostas Bimpikis, Giacomo Mantegazza, Salomón Wollenstein-Betech	A belief-based approach to signaling Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala	An Algorithm for the Assignment Game Beyond Additive Valuations Eric Balkanski, Christopher En, Yuri Faenza	Non-Market Screening with Investment Victor Augias, Eduardo Perez-Richet	Committees and Equilibria: Multiwinner Approval Voting Through the Lens of Budgeting Games Adrian Haret, Sophie Klumper, Jan Maly, Guido Schäfer	Complex Dynamics in Autobidding Systems Renato Paes Leme, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider, Kelly Spendlove, Song Zuo
	Equitable Congestion Pricing under the Markovian Traffic Model: An Application to Bogota Alfredo Torrico, Natthawut Boonsiriphatthanajaroen, Nikhil Garg, Andrea Lodi, Hugo Mainguy	Encouraging a Go-Getter Thomas Brzustowski	Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability Thorben Troebst, Vijay Vazirani	A mechanism-design approach to property rights Piotr Dworczak, Ellen Muir	Monotone Randomized Apportionment Jose Correa, Paul Gölz, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Jamie Tucker-Foltz, Victor Verdugo	Preferences Evolve And So Should Your Bandits: Bandits with Evolving States for Online Platforms Khashayar Khosravi, Renato Paes Leme, Chara Podimata, Apostolis Tsorvantzis
10:00 - 10:30	Coffee Break
10:30 - 11:30	Accepted Papers
	Track A: Actual Games: Chess, Tennis, Mafia	Track B: Prophet Inequalities and Contention Resolution	Track C: Finance and EC	Track D: Learning in Auctions and Resource Allocations	Track E: Approximation Algorithms	Track F: Human-AI Interaction
	Forum (Room 1400)	Room 2200	Room 2420	Room 2400	Room 2410	Room 4200
	Chair: Yiling Chen	Chair: Rad Niazadeh	Chair: James Wright	Chair: Alex Slivkins	Chair: Moshe Babaioff	Chair: Daniel Freund
	Managing Strategic Complexity Jeffrey Ely, Benjamin Golub, Annie Liang, Chaofeng Wu	Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities and transaction fee mechanism design Matthew vonAllmen, Aadityan Ganesh, Jason D. Hartline, Atanu R Sinha	The Hidden Cost of `Zero-Commission’ Simon Jantschgi	Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Paul Duetting, Federico Fusco	Improving Approximation Guarantees for Maximin Share Hannaneh Akrami, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma, Setareh Taki	User Strategization and Trustworthy Algorithms Sarah H. Cen, Andrew Ilyas, Aleksander Ma̧dry
	AI Oversight and Human Mistakes: Evidence from Centre Court David Almog, Romain Gauriot, Lionel Page, Daniel Martin	Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang	With a Grain of Salt: Uncertain Veracity of External News and Firm Disclosures Jonathan Libgober, Beatrice Michaeli, Elyashiv Wiedman	Learning to Maximize Gains From Trade in Small Markets Moshe Babaioff, Amitai Frey, Noam Nisan	Mobility Data in Operations: Multi–Location Facility Location Problem Yiding Feng, Ozan Candogan	Measuring Strategization in Recommendation: Users Adapt Their Behavior to Shape Future Content Sarah H. Cen, Andrew Ilyas, Jennifer Allen, Hannah Li, David G. Rand, Aleksander Ma̧dry
	Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation Luca Carminati, Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm	Online Matching and Contention Resolution for Edge Arrivals with Vanishing Probabilities Will Ma, Calum MacRury, Pranav Nuti	Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquisition Spyros Galanis, Sergei Mikhalishchev	Active Learning for Fair and Stable Online Allocations Riddhiman Bhattacharya, Thanh T Nguyen, Will Wei Sun, Mohit Tawarmalani	Multi-item Resource Allocation for Maximizing Social Welfare under Network Externalities (to be presented in Preview Week) S. Rasoul Etesami	Human-AI Interactions and Societal Pitfalls Francisco Castro, Jian Gao, Sebastien Martin
11:30 - 12:00	Coffee Break
12:00 - 13:00	Plenary - Garrett van Ryzin (Amazon)
	Zhang Auditorum
	"Consensus planning protocol (CPP): A market-based approach to coordination at Amazon"
13:00 - 14:00	Lunch
14:00 - 15:30	Accepted Papers
	Track A: Information in Strategic Settings	Track B: Coalitions and Networks	Track C: Food and Rural Economes	Track D: Online Algorithms	Track E: Fairness	Track F: Contract Design
	Forum (Room 1400)	Room 2200	Room 2420	Room 2400	Room 2410	Room 4200
	Chair: James Wright	Chair: Harry Pei	Chair: Zhen Lian	Chair: Rad Niazadeh	Chair: Daniel Freund	Chair: Paul Dütting
	Privacy and Polarization: An Inference-Based Framework Tommaso Bondi, Omid Rafieian, Yunfei (Jesse) Yao	Stability in Random Hedonic Games Martin Bullinger, Sonja Kraiczy	How effective is the High Stock Delivery Windows Information Sharing Policy for Online Platforms Do Yoon Kim, Benjamin Knight, Dmitry Mitrofanov	Optimal Stopping with Interdependent Values Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser	The Impact of Race-Blind and Test-Optional Admissions on Racial Diversity and Merit Allen Sirolly, Yash Kanoria, Hongyao Ma	Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden Actions Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli
	Common Knowledge, Regained Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yoram Moses	Nonprogressive Diffusion on Social Networks: Approximation and Applications Yunduan Lin, Heng Zhang, Renyu Zhang, Zuo-Jun Max Shen	Ex-Post Equilibrium Market Recommendations Shai Vardi, Chris Parker	Setting Targets is All You Need: Improved Order Competitive Ratio for Online Selection Liyan Chen, Nuozhou Sun, Zhihao Gavin Tang	Redesigning Service Level Agreements: Equity and Efficiency in City Government Operations Zhi Liu, Nikhil Garg	Revisiting the First-Order-Approach to Principal-Agent Problems Hang Jiang, Chen Jin, Luyi Yang
	Dynamic Games with Noisy Informational Asymmetries Francesco Fabbri, Sofia Moroni	Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records Harry Pei	Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma	Approximating Optimum Online for Capacitated Resource Allocation Alexander Braun, Thomas Kesselheim, Tristan Pollner, Amin Saberi	Explainable Affirmative Action Carlos Bonet, Nick Arnosti, Jay Sethuraman	Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal? Yurong Chen, Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Zhiyi Huang
	Acquisition, (Mis)use and Dissemination of Information: The Blessing of Cursedness and Transparency Franz Ostrizek, Elia Sartori	Making a Nash Equilibrium Resilient to Coalitions (Presentation cancelled.) Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz	A Data-driven Approach to Improve Artisans’ Productivity in Distributed Supply Chains Divya Singhvi, Somya Singhvi, Xinyu Zhang	Improved Bounds for Fractional Online Matching Problems Zhihao Gavin Tang, Yuhao Zhang	Equal Pay for Similar Work Diego Gentile Passaro, Fuhito Kojima, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson	Monitoring with Rich Data Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
15:30 - 16:00	Coffee Break
16:00 - 17:00	Awards Session #1 - Best Papers EC 2024
	Zhang Auditorium
	Best Paper with a Student Lead Author Award Learning About Informativeness Wanying Huang
	Best Paper Award and Exemplary Applied Modeling Track Paper When Geography Shapes Preferences: Redesigning Teacher Assignment in Italy Mariagrazia Cavallo, Battal Dogan
	Exemplary AI Track Paper [5-minute spotlight presentation] GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes
	Exemplary Empirics and Experiments Track Paper [5-minute spotlight presentation] Scars of the Gestapo: Remembrance and Privacy Concerns Sebastian Bauer, Florencia Hnilo
	Exemplary Theory Track Paper [5-minute spotlight presentation] Online Mechanism Design with Predictions Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan, Cherlin Zhu
17:00 - 18:30	Town Hall
	Zhang Auditorium
18:30 - 19:30	Reception Generously sponsored by a16z crypto
Wednesday, July 10, 2024
8:00 - 8:30	Breakfast and Registration
8:30 - 10:00	Accepted Papers
	Track A: Social Good	Track B: Social Learning	Track C: Equilibrium Computation	Track D: Matching	Track E: Algorithmic Mechanism Design	Track F: Swap Regret and Calibration
	Forum (Room 1400)	Room 2200	Room 2420	Room 2400	Room 2410	Room 4200
	Chair: Ruta Mehta	Chair: Laura Doval	Chair: Gabriele Farina	Chair: Yash Kanoria	Chair: Kira Goldner	Chair: Rad Niazadeh
	The Dedicated Docket in U.S. Immigration Courts: An analysis of fairness and efficiency properties Daniel Freund, Wentao Weng	Social Learning through Action-Signals Wenji Xu	Two-Timescale Q-Learning with Function Approximation in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games Zaiwei Chen, Kaiqing Zhang, Eric Mazumdar, Asuman Ozdaglar, Adam Wierman	Costly Capacity Signaling Increases Matching Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment Apostolos Filippas, John Horton, Diego Urraca	Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items Mahsa Derakhshan, Emily Ryu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eric Xue	Forecasting for Swap Regret for All Downstream Agents Mirah Shi, Aaron Roth
	Equilibria, Efficiency, and Inequality in Network Formation for Hiring and Opportunity Cynthia Dwork, Chris Hays, Jon Kleinberg, Manish Raghavan	Social Learning with Bounded Rationality: Negative Reviews Persist under Newest First Jackie Baek, Atanas Dinev, Thodoris Lykouris	On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender, Charalampos Kokkalis	Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai, Clayton Thomas	Approximate Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets Thành Nguyen, Alexander Teytelboym	Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion Atulya Jain, Vianney Perchet
	Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action and Choice Rules Oguzhan Celebi	Learning from Viral Content Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He	Nonlinear Fixed Points and Stationarity: Economic Applications Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Giacomo Lanzani, Roberto Corrao	Stable Matching as Transportation Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy	Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan	Pareto-Optimal Algorithms for Learning in Games Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Jon Schneider
	Target the vulnerable? An analysis of rapid rehousing prioritization Felipe Simon, Nick Arnosti		A Smoothed FPTAS for Equilibria in Congestion Games Yiannis Giannakopoulos		Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors Linda Cai, Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier	Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents Natalie Collina, Aaron Roth, Han Shao
10:30 - 11:30	Highlights Beyond EC #1			Highlights Beyond EC #2
	Zhang Auditorum			Room 2400
11:30 - 12:00	Coffee Break
12:00 - 13:30	Plenary - Adam Kalai (OpenAI) and Mikhail Belkin (UCSD)
	Zhang Auditorium
	“When calibration goes awry: hallucination in language models” (Kalai)
	"The puzzle of dimensionality and feature learning from LLMs to kernel machines" (Belkin)
13:30 - 14:30	Lunch			Gender Inclusion Lunch
				Forum (Room 1400)
14:30 - 16:00	Accepted Papers
	Track A: Competition in Marketplaces	Track B: Information Design	Track C: Managing Markets via Incentives	Track D: LLMs	Track E: Contract Design	Track F: Matching
	Forum (Room 1400)	Room 2200	Room 2420	Room 2400	Room 2410	Room: 4200
	Chair: Peng Shi	Chair: Laura Doval	Chair: TBA	Chair: Nicole Immorlica	Chair: Elliot Lipnowski	Chair: Will Ma
	Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places Alon Eden, Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes	Dynamic Evidence Disclosure Jan Knoepfle, Juia Salmi	Full Dynamic Implementation Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, Kei Uzui	Can LLMs Mimic Human-Like Mental Accounting and Behavioral Biases? Yan Leng	Contract Design With Safety Inspections Alireza Fallah, Michael Jordan	Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choice Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Emily Ryu, Eva Tardos
	GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes	Learning from Strategic Sources Kailin Chen	Managing Newsvendors: A Demand Mechanism Yilun Chen, Jiaqi Lu	Eliciting Informative Text Evaluations with Large Language Models Yuqing Kong, Yuxuan Lu, Grant Schoenebeck, Shengwei Xu, Yichi Zhang	Optimal Scoring for Dynamic Information Acquisition Yingkai Li, Jonathan Libgober	Dynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee Resettlement Kirk Bansak, Soonbong Lee, Vahideh Manshadi, Rad Niazadeh, Elisabeth Paulson
	The Welfare Effects of Selling Leads in a Two-Sided Marketplace Peng Shi	Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention Tommaso Denti, Doron Ravid	Incentivizing Resource Pooling Chen Chen, Yilun Chen, Pengyu Qian	Using GPT for Market Research James Brand, Ayelet Israeli, Donald Ngwe	Repeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited Liability Natalie Collina, Varun Gupta, Aaron Roth	Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement Irene Lo, Vahideh Manshadi, Scott Rodilitz, Ali Shameli
	Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization Luca D'Amico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes	Dynamic Competition for Attention Jan Knoepfle	Optimal Queueing Regimes Marco Scarsini, Eran Shmaya	Large Language Models as Simulated Economic Agents: What Can We Learn from Homo Silicus? Apostolos Filippas, John J. Horton, Benjamin S. Manning	Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi	Wisdom and Foolishness of Noisy Matching Markets Kenny Peng, Nikhil Garg
16:00 - 16:30	Coffee Break
16:30 - 18:00	Accepted Papers
	Track A: Blockchains	Track B: Social Choice	Track C: Experimental Design	Track D: Prophet Inequalities	Track E: Labor Markets	Track F: Information and Platforms
	Forum (Room 1400)	Room 2200	Room 2420	Room 2400	Room 2410	Room 4200
	Chair: Elliot Lipnowski	Chair: Ariel Procaccia	Chair: TBA	Chair: Matt Weinberg	Chair: Nicole Immorlica	Chair: Laura Doval
	Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols Matheus Ferreira, Aadityan Ganesh, Jack Hourigan, Hannah Huh, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu	Alpha-Rank-Collections: Analyzing Expected Strategic Behavior with Uncertain Utilities Fabian R. Pieroth, Martin Bichler	Adaptive Neyman Allocation Jinglong Zhao	Sample-Based Matroid Prophet Inequalities Hu Fu, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Tang, Hongxun Wu, Jinzhao Wu, Qianfan Zhang	Behavioral measures improve AI hiring: A field experiment Marie-Pierre Dargnies, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler	Competitive Markets for Personal Data Simone Galperti, Tianhao Liu, Jacopo Perego
	Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg	A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making Tomáš Masařík, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Piotr Skowron	Enhancing External Validity in Experiments with Ongoing Sampling Chen Wang, Shichao Han, Shan Huang	Improved Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities for Graphical Dependencies Vasilis Livanos, Kalen Patton, Sahil Singla	The Impact of AI Technology on the Productivity of Gig Economy Workers Benjamin Knight, Dmitry Mitrofanov, Serguei Netessine	Information Design and Pricing of Supply Competition in Lead-Selling Platforms Niloofar Zamani Foroushani, Yanwei Sun, Zhe Liu, Jiahua Wu
	The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus Eric Budish, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Tim Roughgarden	The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings Patrick Lederer, Dominik Peters, Tomasz Wąs	When Is Heterogeneity Actionable for Targeting? Anya Shchetkina, Ron Berman	Planning against a prophet: a graph-theoretic framework for making sequential decisions Andres Cristi, Sigal Oren	Artificial Intelligence in the Knowledge Economy Enrique Ide, Eduard Talamàs	Learning to Rank under Strategic "Brush Wars" Qinzhen Li, Hongfan (Kevin) Chen, Yifan Feng
	The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis, Kshitij Kulkarni, Alex Evans	Fair, Manipulation-Robust, and Transparent Sortition Carmel Baharav, Bailey Flanigan	Experimenting under Stochastic Congestion Shuangning Li, Ramesh Johari, Xu Kuang, Stefan Wager	The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo	The Effects of Self-Advertising in a Labor Market: Evidence from a Field Experiment Apostolos Filippas, John Horton, Prasanna Parasurama, Diego Urracet	Platform Disintermediation: Information Effects and Pricing Remedies Shreyas Sekar, Auyon Siddiq
18:00 - 21:00	Conference Banquet at New Haven Lawn Club 193 Whitney Avenue, New Haven
Thursday, July 11, 2024
8:00 - 8:30	Breakfast and Registration
8:30 - 10:00	Accepted Papers
	Track A: Econometrics	Track B: Information Design and Mechanisms	Track C: Industrial Organization	Track D: Dynamic Pricing and Repeated Auctions	Track E: Social Choice	Track F: Blockchains
	Forum (Room 1400)	Room 2200	Room 2420	Room 2400	Room 2410	Room 4200
	Chair: Laura Doval	Chair: Elliot Lipnowski	Chair: Matteo Bizzarri	Chair: Sam Taggart	Chair: Ruta Mehta	Chair: Bo Waggoner
	Inference for an Algorithmic Fairness-Accuracy Frontier Francesca Molinari, Yiqi Liu	From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing Tan Gan, Nicholas T. Wu	Supply and demand function competition in input-output networks Matteo Bizzarri	Strategically-Robust Learning Algorithms for Bidding in First-Price Auctions Rachitesh Kumar, Jon Schneider, Balasubramanian Sivan	Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes Daniel Halpern, Safwan Hossain, Jamie Tucker-Foltz	Augmenting Batch Exchanges with Constant Function Market Makers Geoffrey Ramseyer, Mohak Goyal, Ashish Goel, David Mazières
	An Alternative Approach for Nonparametric Analysis of Random Utility Models Christopher Turansick	Certification Design for a Competitive Market Andreas Haupt, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier	Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement Gaurab Aryal, Charles Murry, Pallavi Pal, Arnab Palit	Strategizing against No-Regret Learners in First-Price Auctions Aviad Rubinstein, Junyao Zhao	Maximum Flow is Fair: A Network Flow Approach to Committee Voting Jeremy Vollen, Mashbat Suzuki	Undetectable Selfish Mining Maryam Bahrani, S. Matthew Weinberg
	Preference Regression Peter Caradonna	Robust Advertisement Pricing Tan Gan, Hongcheng Li	Exclusive Contracts in the Video Streaming Market Yihao Yuan	Bandit Sequential Posted Pricing via Half-Concavity Sahil Singla, Yifan Wang	Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p,q)-Veto Core Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan	Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Hao Chung, Tim Roughgarden, Elaine Shi
	On the Limitations of Data-Based Price Discrimination Haitian Xie, Ying Zhu, Denis Shishkin	Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible Learning Doron Ravid, Jeffrey Mensch	A Strategic Model of Software Dependency Networks Cornelius Fritz, Co-Pierre Georg, Angelo Mele, Michael Schweinberger	Bandit Profit-Maximization for Targeted Marketing Joon Suk Huh, Ellen Vitercik, Kirthevasan Kandasamy	Generative Social Choice Sara Fish, Paul Gölz, David C. Parkes, Ariel Procaccia, Gili Rusak, Itai Shapira, Manuel Wuthrich	Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish
10:00 - 10:30	Coffee Break
10:30 - 11:30	Accepted Papers
	Track A: Education	Track B: Mechanism Design and Analysis	Track C: Crowdsourcing	Track D: Mechanisms with Predictions	Track E: Market and Information Design	Track F: Experiments
	Forum (Room 1400)	Room 2200	Room 2420	Room 2400	Room 2410	Room 4200
	Chair: Laura Doval	Chair: Yash Kanoria	Chair: Bo Waggoner	Chair: Federico Echenique	Chair: Elliot Lipnowski	Chair: Ron Berman
	Optimal Cohort Partitions Faidra Monachou, Sofoklis Goulas	Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Song Zuo	The Surprising Benefits of Base Rate Neglect in Robust Aggregation Yuqing Kong, Shu Wang, Ying Wang	To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis	Redistribution Through Market Segmentation Victor Augias, Daniel Barreto, Alexis Ghersengorin	Inclusive Recommendations and User Engagement: Experimental Evidence from Pinterest Madhav Kumar, Pedro Silva, Ashudeep Singh, Abhay Varmaraja
	Algorithmic Precision and Human Decision: A Study of Interactive Optimization for School Schedules Arthur Delarue, Zhen Lian, Sebastien Martin	Understanding Iterative Combinatorial Auction Designs via Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Greg d'Eon, Neil Newman, Kevin Leyton-Brown	Restricting Entries to All-Pay Contests Fupeng Sun, Yanwei Sun, Chiwei Yan, Li Jin	Online Mechanism Design with Predictions Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan, Cherlin Zhu	Optimal Design of Default Donations Francisco Castro, Scott Rodilitz	Algorithmic vs. Friend-based Recommendations in Shaping Novel Content Engagement: A Large-scale Field Experiment Shan Huang, Yi JI
	Machine Learning-Powered Course Allocation Ermis Soumalias, Behnoosh Zamanlooy, Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken	Duopoly Assortment Competition under the Multinomial Logit Model: Simultaneous vs. Sequential (to be presented in Preview Week) Kameng Nip, Changjun Wang	Full Accuracy Scoring Accelerates the Discovery of Skilled Forecasters Pavel Atanasov, Ezra Karger, Philip Tetlock	Competitive Auctions with Imperfect Predictions (to be presented in Preview Week) Pinyan Lu, Zongqi Wan, Jialin Zhang	A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Michael Wang	Scars of the Gestapo: Remembrance and Privacy Concerns Sebastian Bauer, Florencia Hnilo
11:30 - 12:00	Coffee Break
12:00 - 13:00	Plenary - Federico Echenique (UC Berkeley)
	Zhang Auditorium
	"Preference and utility recovery from choice data"
13:00 - 14:30	Lunch			Junior-Senior Lunch (sign-ups required)
				Forum (Room 1400)
14:30 - 16:00	Accepted Papers
	Track A: Decision Thory and Search Theory	Track B: Persuasion	Track C: Causal Inference	Track D: Fair Division	Track E: Resource Allocation	Track F: Contract Design
	Forum (Room 1400)	Room 2200	Room 2420	Room 2400	Room 2410	Room 4200
	Chair: Fedor Sandomirsky	Chair: Laura Doval	Chair: David Pennock	Chair: Ruta Mehta	Chair: Brendan Lucier	Chair: Paul Dütting
	Search and Rediscovery Martino Banchio, Suraj Malladi	The Core of Bayesian persuasion Laura Doval, Ran Eilat	Estimating Treatment Effects under Recommender Interference: A Structured Neural Networks Approach Ruohan Zhan, Shichao Han, Yuchen Hu, Zhenling Jiang	Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka	Efficient and Strategy-proof Mechanism under General Constraints Kenzo Imamura, Yasushi Kawase	Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard Jeffrey Ely, George Georgiadis, Luis Rayo
	Decomposable Stochastic Choice Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz	Incentivized Exploration via Filtered Posterior Sampling Anand Kalvit, Yonatan Gur, Aleksandrs Slivkins	Forecasting Algorithms for Causal Inference with Panel Data Justin Young, Julian Nyarko, Jacob Goldin	On the Fairness of Normalized p-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores Owen Eckart, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma	Equilibrium in Pseudomarkets Thành Nguyen, Alexander Teytelboym	Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti
	Posterior-Mean Separable Costs of Information Acquisition Jeffrey Mensch, Komal Malik	Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication Xiaoyu Cheng, Peter Klibanoff, Sujoy Mukerji, Ludovic Renou	Coarse Personalization Walter Zhang, Sanjog Misra	Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alkmini Sgouritsa	Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited Kenzo Imamura, Keisuke Bando, Tomoya Kazumura	Optimal Robust Contract Design Bo Peng, Zhihao Gavin Tang
	The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality Zihao Li, Jonathan Libgober	Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric Senders Zhicheng Du, Wei Tang, Zihe Wang, Shuo Zhang	Minimax-Regret Sample Selection in Randomized Experiments Yuchen Hu, Henry Zhu, Emma Brunskil, Stefan Wager	On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations Gerdus Benade, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma	Multi-Criteria Allocation Mechanisms: Constraints and Comparative Statics (Presentation canceled.) Afshin Nikzad	Optimality of Weighted Contracts for Multi-agent Contract Design with a Budget Wade Hann-Caruthers, Sumit Goel
16:00 - 16:30	Coffee Break
16:30 - 18:00	Awards Session #2 - Mid-career/Doctoral Dissertation/Test of Time
	Zhang Auditorium
18:00	Adjourn